Employers Resource Management Co. v. Ronk Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 44511 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-3-2017
Employers Resource Management Co. v. Ronk
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44511
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Employers Resource Management Co. v. Ronk Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44511" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All.
6533.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6533
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Supreme Court No. 44511 
V. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of the 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________ ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada 
Case No. CV OC 1605467 
****** 
Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge, presiding 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NEILD. MCFEELEY, ISB #3564 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
CARL J. WITHROE, ISB #7051 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073 
earl. withroe@ag.idaho.gov 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
ERBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW 
& MCKLVEEN, CHTD. 
1111 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
nmcfeeley@eberle.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
FEBO 3 2017 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................................................................. 1 
I. 
IL 
Nature of the Case ............................................................................. . 
Factual and Procedural Background ................................................. . 
1 
2 
ISSUES PRESENTED............................................................................................... 5 
STANDARD OF REVIEW....................................................................................... 5 
ARGUMENT............................................................................................................ 6 
DISMISSAL WAS PROPER BECAUSE ERMC FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE IDAHO 
REIMBURSEMENT INCENTIVE ACT...................................................... 6 
A. To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must establish 
that it has suffered or will suffer distinct and 
palpable actual or imminent injury-in-fact to a 
protectable legal interest; that the injury is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct; and that a 
favorable judgment will redress the injury . . . . . ... .. .. .. .. . . ... .. ... 6 
B. 
C. 
ERMC's alleged harm is conjectural and is not 
fairly traceable to the Reimbursement Incentive Act ......... . 
The competitor standing theory cannot overcome 
alleged harm that is conjectural and is not fairly 
traceable to the challenged law ........................................... . 
8 
14 
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 17 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 
331 P.3d 523 (2014)................................................................................................ 7 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ........................................................................ 13, 16 
American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ...................................................................................................... 12, 16 
ASARCO Inc. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (Op. of Kennedy, J.)............................. 12 
Berry v. City of Little Rock, 904 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Ark. 1995)............................... 7 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) ....................................... 10, 13, 14 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)..................................................... 14 
Common Cause v. Dep 't of Energy, 702 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ......................... 12 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 2015 WL 7421342, No. 43169 
(Idaho Nov. 20, 2015)............................................................................................. 11 
DEK Energy Co. v. FERC, 248 F.3d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ..................................... 10, 16 
Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991)...................................................... 12, 16 
Idaho Sch.for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 
850 P.2d 724 (1993)................................................................................................ 4 
Larid v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)............................................................................. 11 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................ 7, 11 
Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P .3d 1243 (2011) .............................. passim 
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989) .............................. 6 
National Tank Truck Carriers v. Lewis, 550 F. Supp. 113 (D.D.C. 1982)................ 11, 13 
11 
Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2005) .................................... 13 
Petro-Chem Processing, Inc. v. Envtl. Prat. Agency, 866 F.2d 433 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................................... 13 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) ......................................................................... 7 
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass 'n v. State, 128 Idaho 831, 919 P.2d 1032 (1996)............... 7 
Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ..................................................... 9, 10, 15 
State v. Philip Morris, 158 Idaho 874,354 P.3d 187 (2015)..................................... 6, 7 
US. Telecom Assoc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 295 F.3d 1326 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................... 15, 16 
Young v. City of Ketchum, 13 7 Idaho 102, 44 P .3d 1157 (2002) .............................. 6, 7 
Idaho Code 
Idaho Code § 63-3029B ............................................................................................. 10 
Idaho Code§ 63-3029C............................................................................................. 10 
Idaho Code § 63-30290 ............................................................................................. 10 
Idaho Code§ 63-3029I .............................................................................................. 10 
Idaho Code § 63-3029J .............................................................................................. 10 
Idaho Code§ 63-3029EE........................................................................................... 10 
Idaho Code§ 63-4403................................................................................................ 10 
Idaho Code § 63-4405. ... .. .. .. .. ... ... . ... .. .... ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .... .. . ... .. .. ... .. .. .. . .. .. . . ... . .. . .. .... . ... .. 10 
Idaho Code§ 67-4738(5) ........................................................................................... 2 
Idaho Code§ 67-4738(11), (12) ................................................................................ 2 
Idaho Code§ 67-4739................................................................................................ 2 
Idaho Code§ 67-4739(1)(c)....................................................................................... 2 
Idaho Code§ 67-4739(2) ........................................................................................... 2 
Idaho Code§ 67-4740................................................................................................ 2, 3 
Idaho Code§ 67-4741................................................................................................ 3 
Idaho Code§ 67-4741(2) ........................................................................................... 3 
Idaho Code§ 67-4741(3) ........................................................................................... 3 
Idaho Code§ 67-4741(c) ........................................................................................... 3 
Idaho Code§ 67-4742................................................................................................ 3 
111 
Rules 
1.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) ........................................................................................................ 5 
United States Code 
28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) ................................................................................................... 16 
Other Authorities 
John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical 
View, 92 Va. L. Rev. 375 (2006) ............................................................................ 9 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Idaho is one of many states to incentivize the creation of private-sector jobs. The state 
has done this through its Reimbursement Incentive Act; which makes refundable tax credits 
available to businesses in any industry with a competitive project that adds a minimum of new, 
full-time, nonseasonal jobs (depending on whether the location is urban or rural), that pay an 
average wage that equals or exceeds the wage for the county where the business is located. The 
Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce reviews applications and refers applications that 
establish eligibility to the Idaho Economic Advisory Council for its review and decision. 
The Appellant, Employers Resource Management Company-ERMC, as it will be 
called-sued Idaho Commerce Director Megan Ronk, challenging the entire program as 
unconstitutional. The Reimbursement Incentive Act does not actually do anything to ERMC: It 
does not extract any money from the company or require the company to do anything. ERMC 
did not even ever apply for a credit. Instead, ERMC based its claim of injury-which is 
necessary to establish standing to sue-on the grant of a tax credit to one of ERMC's 
competitors. The argument went that because the competitor received a tax credit, ERMC would 
have to upgrade its resources and work harder to keep its employees and do other things to keep 
up. So, ERMC argued, it had standing to protect its competitive interests under the so-called 
"competitor standing" rule adopted from federal courts. The problem with this is, as the district 
court found, that a bare claim of increased competition is insufficient to establish standing. 
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Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011). So the district court dismissed 
the case. 
II. Factual and Procedural Background 
The program at issue in this case, established under the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive 
Act, makes refundable tax credits available to businesses in any industry with a competitive 
project that adds a minimum number of new, full-time, nonseasonal jobs (depending on whether 
the location is rural or urban) paying an average wage that equals or exceeds the wage for the 
county where the business is located. See Idaho Code § 67-4738(11), (12). The credit is 
available to both existing Idaho businesses and new Idaho businesses. A successful applicant 
may receive a refundable tax credit for up to 15 years and up to 30% of the new revenue Idaho 
receives from the company's corporate income tax, payroll taxes, and sales and use tax 
attributable to a new project. The Idaho Department of Commerce administers the program. 
Idaho Code§ 67-4740. 
A business seeking the credit must apply. Idaho Code § 67-4739. Among the many 
requirements an applicant must satisfy is that a business must demonstrate community support. 
Id. at (l)(c). This means that the applicable local government unit must demonstrate "active 
support of the applicant" including a contribution of money, fee waivers, in-kind services, 
providing infrastructure, or a combination of these things. Idaho Code§ 67-4738(5). A letter of 
commitment by the local governing board must accompany the community match. Id. 
As part of her review process, the Commerce director and her office conduct an in-depth 
economic analysis of the project and its application material. This includes analysis of both the 
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benefits and potential detriments to the state or existing industries in the state. See Idaho Code § 
67-4741(c) After the Commerce director reviews the application and if she determines that the 
applicant has established eligibility for the credit, the director submits the application and her 
recommended term and percentage of refund to the Economic Advisory Council for its review. 
Idaho Code § 67-4739(2). The Council may approve or reject the project; and, it may ask for 
additional information to aid its review. Id. If the Council approves the application and the 
director's recommended terms, the applicant business and the Commerce Department enter into 
an agreement specifying the terms of the credit, including the duration of the credit, the 
forecasted amount of new tax revenue the project will generate, and the percentage of tax 
revenues that will be reimbursed to the project. Idaho Code§ 67-4740. 
The tax credit under the Reimbursement Incentive Act is a performance-based credit. 
Each year, every business that has entered into an agreement with the Commerce Department for 
a tax credit must provide a detailed report demonstrating compliance with its agreement and the 
other requirements. Idaho Code § 67-4 7 41. If on review, the Commerce Department determines 
the applicant's information is inadequate to justify the tax credit, the Commerce Department may 
seek further information, or deny the credit. Id. at (2). If the Commerce Department determines 
the information provided by the applicant justifies a tax credit, the Commerce Department issues 
the tax credit authorization and provides a copy of the authorization to the Idaho State Tax 
Commission. Id. at (3 ). The applicant then claims the credit on its tax return. The Commerce 
Department must file a report annually with the Governor and Legislature detailing the 
Commerce Department's success, with specific economic metrics. Idaho Code§ 67-4742. 
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ERMC sued Idaho Commerce Director Megan Ronk in Ada County in March 2016. R. 
p. 5. In its complaint, ERMC complained that under the Act, taxpayers "will suffer irreparable 
harm" if the Commerce Department continues to be able to grant tax credits (R. p. 11 ), and that 
the 12:rant of a tax credit to one of ERM C's comnetitors 2:ave the comnetitor an "unfair economic 
.._, ..I.. "-' .1.- - - ---- --------- - - - - ---- -
advantage," which, ERMC claimed, would allow the competitor to "lure [ERMC'S] employees 
away .... " R. p. 7. Director Ronk moved to dismiss. She argued that there is no general 
taxpayer standing in Idaho, Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 
850 P .2d 724 (1993), so ERMC could not pursue its claim as a taxpayer or on behalf of 
taxpayers. And the claim of increased competition was foreclosed by Martin v. Camas County, 
where the Court said that it "has never held that increased competition alone is sufficient to 
confer standing." 150 Idaho at 514,248 P.3d at 1249. 
Once presented with Director Ronk's motion, ERMC sought leave to amend its 
complaint. It retained its claim that the program gave competitors an unfair economic advantage 
over it, and that Idaho taxpayers would suffer, but it added some new allegations of injury: It 
claimed that the competitor was an internet-based company, and so ERMC had to buy "internet 
competitive software" to keep up. R. p. 41. And, since the competitor's tax credit is determined 
in part based on the number of employees it hires, ERMC "expects" that the competitor will seek 
to lure its "key employees" away. Id. ERMC "anticipate[s] the need to protect its existing Idaho 
business since [the competitor] can afford to undercut [ERMC's] pricing .... " R. p. 42. So, 
ERMC claimed, it "will incur expenses in advertising and marketing expenses to retain its 
clients." Id. 
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More generally, ERMC complained that the program "reward[ s] the cannibalization of 
existing Idaho businesses," "distort[ s] the Idaho labor market" by "incentivizing [ERMC] and 
other existing Idaho businesses to relocate their principal offices" to states with similar tax 
incentives, "penalize[es] Idaho companies with established business in 'niche' markets," and 
"pit[ s] Counties and Municipalities against each other .... " Id. 
Based on the tax credit to ERMC's competitor, ERMC argued it just could not compete. 
R. p. 30. ERMC argued that these allegations established that it would suffer certain and 
imminent harm to its competitive interests in the market and that the harm it would suffer was 
unique to it. Id. The district court rejected these contentions, ruling that ERMC did not have a 
protectable interest in its competitive position in the marketplace (R. p. 81 ), and that the harm it 
alleged it would suffer was "abstract and speculative," not distinct and palpable. R. p. 82. The 
district court's judgment issued on August 15, 2016, and the appeal from that judgment 
followed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The sole issue on appeal is whether ERMC has standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act when its sole allegations of harm are speculative, ill-
defined, and self-inflicted and where it cannot show distinct and palpable injury to a protectable 
legal interest. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
The district court decided Director Ronk's motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). So, the Court's task is to look solely to the pleadings to determine whether a claim for 
5 
relief has been stated. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 
(2002). When the motion is, as Director Ronk's motion was, a motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing, the Court will examine whether ERMC has sufficiently alleged the requisite elements 
of standing in their complaint to survive the motion to dismiss. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
DISMISSAL WAS PROPER BECAUSE ERMC FAILED TO ESTABLISH STANDING 
TO CHALLENGE THE IDAHO REIMBURSEMENT INCENTIVE ACT 
I. To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must establish that it has suffered or 
will suffer distinct and palpable actual or imminent injury-in-fact to a 
protectable legal interest; that the injury is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct; and that a favorable judgment will redress the 
injury. 
A necessary component of a valid claim is standing. Standing relates to the broader 
concept of justiciability. Justiciability is concerned with identifying "appropriate or suitable 
occasions for adjudication by a court." State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.3d 
187, 194 (2015). To that end, courts have devised mechanisms to ensure that they decide actual 
controversies between actual legal adversaries having actual stakes in the cases they are 
presented with. See Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). 
In other words, justiciability rules exist to prevent plaintiffs or parties from pulling courts into 
disputes that are best left for other forums or for the other two branches of government. 
Standing focuses on harm to the plaintiff, not on the issues the party wants decided. Id. 
To show standing, and thus to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must "allege or 
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
6 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. The plaintiffs injury must be 
"peculiar or personal that is different than that suffered by any other member of the public." 
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State, 128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). There is 
more to the injury requirement than "the defendant harmed me"; standing necessitates a 
"showing of 'distinct palpable injury' and 'fairly traceable causal connection between the 
claimed injury and the challenged conduct."' Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 
P.3d at 1159. And the alleged injury must be real-that is, it must be concrete and 
particularized and actual or imminent, and cannot be conjectural or hypothetical. State v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho at 882, 354 P.3d at 195. Vague possibilities of some injury are not 
enough: "standing can never be assumed based on a merely hypothetical injury." Id. And it is 
not enough to merely allege harm. As this Court has said, "when standing is challenged, mere 
allegations are not sufficient, and the party invoking the court's jurisdiction must demonstrate 
facts supporting this allegation." Id. 
Idaho has adopted the federal justiciability standards, which are grounded in the 
constitution. ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 783, 331 P.3d 523, 
525 (2014). Under the U.S. Supreme Court's standards for justiciability, standing requirements 
must be "especially rigorous" when courts are asked to conduct constitutional review of the 
actions of co-equal branches of government. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997). 
Additionally, the harm must be to a legally protected interest. Berry v. City of Little Rock, 904 
F.Supp. 940 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992). 
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II. ERMC's alleged harm is conjectural and is not fairly traceable to the 
Reimbursement Incentive Act. 
ERMC hangs its standing argument on the claim that the grant of a tax credit to its 
competitor will increase competition in the market where ERMC participates. That increased 
competition, the company says, has forced, and it thinks will force, the company to do things to 
meet this competition. It alleges it has had to buy some software and "expects" that it will have 
to do certain things to keep its employees from moving to the competitor. It "anticipates" that 
the competitor will be able to "undercut" its pricing, and so it will have to protect its existing 
business by advertising and marketing. Thus, it says, it has standing as a competitor to protect 
itself from government action that increases competition. These claims do nothing to 
meaningfully distinguish this case from Martin v. Camas County. There, the Court rejected the 
plaintiff developer's argument that a county's rezone of other properties to the same designation 
as his properties would increase the supply of available lots and thereby reduce the value of his. 
It was not enough, the Court said, that the rezoning would increase the number of lots; the 
developer "failed to show that he has suffered or is likely to suffer any injury" and that he was 
"merely speculat[ing] that increased competition will decrease the future value of his property." 
150 Idaho at 515, 248 P.3d at 1250. 
Just as the developer in Martin failed to show that the increase in the supply of building 
lots ( and the attendant competition for buyers) would cause him any harm, here, too, ERMC has 
merely guessed at what the tax credit to another company will do to its business. It simply 
"expects" it will have to work to keep its present employees. It "anticipates" that it will have to 
8 
work harder to market itself to keep its existing business. But none of those things is certain or 
imminent. 
This is not enough. ERMC argues that status as a competitor and its alleged harm are 
enough, but applying the competitor standing label to a claim does not obviate its need to show 
actual or imminent concrete injury. Competitor standing falls under the injury-in-fact prong. Its 
habitat is largely the D.C. Circuit, which is the primary enclave for litigation challenging things 
the federal government does. See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D. C. Circuit Different? 
A Historical View, 92 Va. L. Rev. 375, 376-77 (2006). And lots of these challenges involve 
highly regulated industries regulated by an alphabet soup of agencies-the EPA, FERC, the 
NLRB, the FAA, and the FCC, to name a few-under highly complex and detailed rules. These 
agencies may set rates, establish criteria for participation in a market, or otherwise manage the 
small details of participating in a particular industry. Spawning from challenges to federal 
agency conduct by competitors alleging that the agency that controls so much of the market, the 
D.C. Circuit postulates that companies have a protectable interest in their position in the 
marketplace and that "economic actors 'suffer [an] injury in fact when agencies lift restrictions 
on their competitors or otherwise allow increased competition' against them." Sherley v. 
Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 
F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The theory is that a business's protectable position in the 
marketplace is assumed to be injured when government action that increases competition is 
certain and imminent. 
And a party's obligation to show injury-in-fact 1s not absolved simply because the 
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plaintiff may be a competitor of another company affected by the challenged conduct. The 
increase in competition must be "imminent." See Sherley, 610 F.3d at 73-74 (increase in 
competition was "imminent"; La. Energy & Power Auth., 141 F.3d at 367 (same). The D.C. 
Circuit has declined, for example, to find competitor standing where there was only "some vague 
probability" of increased competition and "a still lower probability" of injury from that 
competition. DEK Energy Co. v. FERC, 248 F.3d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2001). And the 
concreteness requirement remains. The less imminent the injury is, the more difficult time a 
plaintiff has showing concreteness. The U.S. Supreme Court has "repeatedly reiterated that 
'threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,' and that ' [ a ]llegations 
of possible future injury are not sufficient."' Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 
1147 (2013) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
Vague notions of expecting to do some things and anticipating the need to do others is 
ill-defined, so it is even more difficult to demonstrate concrete or imminent harm. Besides, there 
are already several tax and other incentives available to businesses that may have some role in 
how companies do business and compete in their various markets.' There are simply too many 
forces at work to credit fuzzy claims based on expectations and anticipations to find standing. 
A summary of some of these incentives is available here: 
https://commercestorage.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/Documents/Incentives One-
sheet FINAL condensed.pdf. And Idaho's tax code contains several tax credits that businesses 
may take advantage of. See Idaho Code §§ 63-3029B (tax credit for capital investment); -3029D 
(qualified equipment utilizing postconsumer waste or postindustrial waste); -3029G (research 
activities); -30291 (investment in broadband equipment); -3029J (incentive income tax 
investment credit); -3029EE (new employees); -4403 ( capital investment); -4405 (tax credit for 
new jobs). 
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National Tank Truck Carriers v. Lewis, 550 F. Supp. 113 (D.D.C. 1982), provides an example. 
There, the federal Transportation Department lowered the amount of insurance that tank truck 
carriers had to maintain. The plaintiff, an organization representing tank truck carriers, claimed 
that lower insurance levels would foster a poor safety record for the industry, thereby increasing 
the price carriers would have to pay for insurance. 550 F. Supp. at 116. The court found the 
organization's claim of harm to be "impossible to ascertain" a prediction of how differences in 
insurance coverage would affect future premiums. Id. And here, it is impossible to predict much 
of anything about how ERMC's business will be affected by a tax credit given to another 
company. 
ERMC attempts to distinguish its complaint from Martin, and says its case is more like 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 2015 WL 7421342, No. 43169 (Idaho Nov. 20, 2015). That 
case actually demonstrates the incorrectness of ERMC's position. There, the Court, following 
Martin, said that while the Tribe had an interest in its gaming activities, an increase in gaming 
opportunities by others was not, by itself, sufficient to show standing. 2015 WL 7421342 at *3. 
Part of the difficulty ERMC faces in establishing standing is that it is not the object of the 
government action. ERMC challenges the government's treatment of someone else, rather than 
government conduct that does anything directly (if at all) to it. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
made clear that "when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction 
he challenges, standing is not precluded but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to 
establish." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562. This is because, in such a case, 
"[t]he existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing 'depends on the unfettered 
11 
choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and 
legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume to either control or predict .... " Id. (quoting 
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (Op. of Kennedy, J.)). So, for example, the 
D.C. Circuit has denied standing where "the plaintiff seeks to change the defendant's behavior 
only as a means to alter the conduct of a third party, not before the court, who is the direct source 
of the plaintiffs injury." Common Cause v. Dep't of Energy, 702 F.2d 245, 251 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). Having failed to allege, much less demonstrate, actual or imminent concrete or certain 
harm, ERMC has failed an essential element of standing. 
Plaintiffs challenging the tax treatment of competitors have no easier go at demonstrating 
standing. The problem is in showing both imminence and concreteness; it lies in the nature of 
challenges to government treatment of someone else, and the contingent and speculative nature 
of the harm flowing from that treatment. An example of this is American Society of Travel 
Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There, for-profit private travel agents 
earned their living primarily on commissions gained from selling transportation and travel-
related services in the States and abroad. Id. at 148. The plaintiff travel agents in the case 
challenged the tax-exempt status of income from tax-exempt 501(c)(3) companies selling 
transportation and travel-related services-in direct competition with the travel agents. Id. Just 
like ERMC, the travel agents complained that their injury arose from the Internal Revenue 
Service's "creation of an unfair competitive atmosphere .... " Id. at 149. But that was not good 
enough to demonstrate standing. It was "too speculative." Id. 
And in Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the D.C. Circuit denied standing 
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to a political candidate excluded from debates hosted by a non-profit organization who sought to 
challenge the organization's tax treatment. The plaintiff rooted her challenge in competitor 
standing, but the court found her claim of injury too contingent to satisfy standing requirements. 
The court noted that the plaintiff was "challenging the actions of the IRS only as a means of 
affecting the behavior of the [tax exempt debate-hosting organization]." The IRS actions 
"caused her alleged injury only due to other intervening causal factors, including the FEC's 
regulations, the [debate-hosting organization's] actions, and the anticipated behavior of other 
debate participants." Id. 1330-31. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (parents of 
African-American children could not challenge IRS regulations governing tax-exempt status of 
private schools; claimed injury that exempt schools could draw white students, thus perpetuating 
racial segregation, was "entirely speculative"). National Tank Truck Carriers v. Lewis, 550 F. 
Supp. 113 (D.D.C. 1982). 
But ERMC's case has another problem. It has attempted to manufacture standing 
through self-inflicted harm. The injury-in-fact requirement cannot be satisfied by self-inflicted 
harm. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1157 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005); Petro-Chem 
Processing, Inc. v. Envtl. Prat. Agency, 866 F.2d 433,438 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Clapper v. Amnesty 
International, 133 S. Ct. at 1152-53. Self-inflicted harm done in anticipatory response to 
government conduct of which a plaintiff is not the object, breaks the causal chain necessary to 
show standing. Because ERMC has simply alleged a general "unfair advantage," its own 
expected conduct based on that alleged unfair advantage deprives the government conduct of any 
causal connection to ERMC's alleged harm. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, for example, 
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the plaintiffs claimed that they had incurred costs based on a fear of being surveilled by a 
surveillance statute they challenged. But they lacked standing to challenge the statutory 
surveillance program because absent a "threat of certainly impending interception under§ 1881a 
[the surveillance statute at issue], the costs that they have incurred to avoid surveillance are 
simply the product of their fear of surveillance," and that fear was "insufficient to create 
standing." 133 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing Larid v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)). Under the rationale in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, the steps ERMC itself says it has taken or anticipates it will 
have to take are insufficient to establish standing. 
III. The competitor standing theory cannot overcome alleged harm that is 
conjectural and is not fairly traceable to the challenged law. 
The foregoing demonstrates that mere status as a competitor, and government action that 
may increase competition, is insufficient, by itself, to establish standing. ERMC's statement of 
the competitor standing rule and the cases it cites do not help its position. Take first Clinton v. 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The potato growers there would have lost a tax credit if 
the President's line-item veto effectively eliminating the credit had stood. ERMC suggests that 
the potato growers had competitor standing "to challenge the President's cancellation of a tax 
benefit that put [the potato growers] at a disadvantage with its competitors." Brief for Appellant, 
p. 13. But what ERMC misses is that the statute gave the growers something that the line-item 
veto would have taken away. Standing there is fairly straightforward; the plaintiff was the object 
of the challenged governmental conduct. Indeed, the tax credit was a "bargaining chip" for 
parties like the potato growers to use in acquiring assets; "[b]y depriving them of their statutory 
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bargaining chip, the cancellation [ of the tax credit] inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic 
injury to establish standing under our precedents." Id. at 432. But the ERMC here is not the 
object of the governmental action that it is challenging 
Sherlev v. Sebelius is of no helo to ERMC either. There. the National Institutes of Health 
.,, .1. ,, - - - - - - ---
issued guidelines pursuant to presidential order that expanded the scope of stem-cell research 
projects that could be funded by the National Institutes of Health. 610 F.3d at 70-71. A group of 
physicians challenged that order as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, the 
NIH guidelines pennitted new entrants into a market for fixed resources; plaintiff physicians 
would face imminent increased competition for access to this limited, fixed amount of NIH 
funding. This intensified competition, though, was a certainty. Id. at 74. Importantly, the 
government in Sherley lifted regulatory restrictions that drew more competitors into a market 
with limited funds to disperse. Here, of course, the Reimbursement Incentive Act merely makes 
money available to a business that meets the standards set out in the statute. And ERMC fails to 
allege any facts relating to actual competition. Again, its only allegations are that it may have to 
do certain things to compete. But ERMC fails to even allege what the market is, its share, and 
how, precisely, the tax credit-rather than all the other market factors-would injure ERMC's 
competitive position in the market. It is therefore far from a certainty-indeed, it is purely 
speculative-whether ERMC will be injured and how the grant of a tax credit to one competitor 
will harm it. 
ERMC's case is also unlike US. Telecom Association v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 295 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2002). There, telecom providers challenged the FCC's 
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order that another telecom provider was a common carrier under the Telecommunications Act 
and therefore eligible for a subsidy for which the petitioners were not. The common carrier 
classification and its attendant subsidy allowed the competitor to sell telecom services at a lower 
cost than the petitioners. Id. at 1331. It was in the context of this differential treatment of two 
classes of providers-one eligible for a subsidy, one not-that the D.C. Circuit found injury to 
competitive interests sufficient to establish standing. Here, of course, ERMC is eligible to apply 
for the tax credit if it does the things the statute requires. It has simply chosen not to. 
The D.C. Circuit's finding of standing in US. Telecom Association was aided by 
affidavits submitted by the petitioners showing that they had lost out on contracts and that the 
subsidy flowing from the common carrier classification left them "unable to compete for new 
customers .... " Id. 2 Even if such showing of harm was relevant in this case or could be made, 
ERMC has not alleged anything other than speculative guesses at what it may have to do to 
maintain a competitive position in the marketplace. It has not alleged loss of sales, contracts, 
clients, or an inability to secure new contracts. ERMC is more like the developer in Martin, the 
travel agents in American Society of Travel Agents, the candidate in Fulani, the parents in Allen 
v. Wright, and the energy company in DEK Energy. This is not a situation where ERMC and the 
competitor play under different sets of rules. ERMC is fully eligible to do the things necessary 
to be eligible for the tax credit, apply for it, and benefit from it. This is not a case where a 
2 The affidavits were submitted after oral argument in the D.C. Circuit, id. at 1330, not on 
summary judgment, as Plaintiff suggests. See Brief for Appellant, p. 15. The case was a petition 
for review of the FCC order, which means there was no district court and no motion for summary 
judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
validity of final orders of the FCC). 
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competitor has been given a clearer path that ERMC cannot seek to join. And this is not a case 
where a regulatory body has expanded the class of businesses that may participate in a given 
market. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgment should be affirmed. 
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